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From the standpoint of the religious pacifist, Professor Zahn sees
"elementary human rights" beginning
at the "moment of conception marking the beginning of the individual's
life process, " and argues against
abortion from this point.

A Religious Pacifist Looks at Abortion
Gordon C. Zahn
Prudence, if nothing else, wou ld
seem to didate that a celibate male,
especially one committed to pacifism,
sho uld avoid getting embroiled in
con troversy with the women's I iberation crowd . Ordinarily I would be all
set to go along with this and not on ly
for reasons of such prudential restraint. I am in general agreement with
the movement's object ives and principles and more than ready to give it
the benefit of almost every doubt even though I do wish at times that its
principa l spokesmen (?) could be a
litt le more, if not "ladylike," at least
gentleman ly in their rhetoric and tone.
But these are minor reservations.
There is one point of substance,
however, on which I must register
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strong disagreement , and that is the
increasing emphasis being placed on
"free abortion on demand" as a
principal plank in the liberationists'
platform . From my pe rspective as a
religious pacifist , I find this proposal
thoroughly abhorrent; and I am
disturbed by the willingness of so
many who share my political and
theological approach in most respects
to go a long with or condone a practice
which so clearly contradicts the values
upon which that approach is based.
In the past
have criticized
"establishment" Christians, in particular official Catholic ecclesiastical
and theological spokesmen, for their
hypersensitivity to the evil of killing
the unborn and their almost total
disregard of the evil of "post-natal"
abortion in the form of the who lesale
destruct ion of human life in war. The
argument works both ways and with
equal force: those of us who oppose
war cannot be any less concerned
abo ut the destruction of human life in
the womb .

In discussing this issue from a
pacifist standpoin t [ do not intend to
enter upon two controversies which,
though clearly related to the problem
of abortion, are somewhat peripheral
to my essential concern for life and
the reverence for life. Thus , the whole
question of the morality of contraception, obviously one of the alternatives to abortion as a means of
popula tion control, involves moral
principle s of an altogether different
order. More closely related but also
excluded from consideration here is
the legal question , that is whether or
not anti-abortion legislation now on
the statute books should be repealed ,
modified , or retained. One can argue,
as I shall here, that abortion is
immoral and still recognize compelling
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practical and theoretical reasons for
not using state authority to impose a
moral judgment that falls so far short
of universal acceptance within the
polical community . On the other
hand, there are equally compelling
arguments upholding legal prohibition
of what has long bee n considered by
many to be a form of murder; and this
takes on added force to the extent
that repeal of laws already in effect
will be interpreted as official authorization of the hitherto forbidden
practice. Since the in tention here is to
discuss the objections to abortion
itself, this very important legal question will be left for others to debate
and resolve.
Nor will I comment upon what [
consider the tactical blunder on the
part of the liberationists to "borrow
trouble" by making so touchy an issue
- on emotional as well as moral
grounds - a central part of their
program. I must , however, reject the
rationale that is usually advanced to
support their demands, the 'property
rights" line which holds that because a
woman's body is "her own ," she and
she alone must be left free to decide
what is to be done about the
developing fetus. Leaving aside the
obvious fact that the presence of the
fetus suggests a decision that could
have been made earlier, this line of
argument represents a crude reversion
to the model of laissez-faire economics
Catholics of a liberal or radical
persuasion have long since repudiated.
Even if one were to accept the
characterization of a woman's body as
"property" (is it not one of the
Iiberationists' complaints that men and
man-made laws have reduced her to
that status?) , the claim to absolute
rights of use and disposal of that
property could not be taken seriously.
The owner of a badly needed residential building is not , or at least should
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not be, free to evict his tenants to suit
a selfish whim or to convert his
property to some frivolous or nonessentia l use. In such a case we would
insist upon the traditional distinction
which describes property as private in
ownership but social in use.

To use anot her example , the moral
evil associated with prostitution does
not lie solely, perhaps not even
primarily, in the illicit sex relationship
but, rather, in the degradation of a
person to precisely this status of a
"property" available for "use" on a
rental or purchase basis . It is a tragic
irony that the advocates of true and
fu ll personhood for women have
chosen to provide ideological justification for attitudes which have interfered with recognition of that personhood in the past.

This is not to say , of course , th at a
woman does not have prior rights over
her own body but only that the
exercise of those righ ts must take in to
account the rights of others. In
monogamous marriage this would
preclude a wife's "freedom" to commit adultery (a principle , it should be
unnecessary to add, which applies to
the husband as well) . Similarly, in the
case of a pregnancy in wedlock, the
husband's righ ts concerning the unborn chi ld must be respected too ;
indeed, even in a pregna ncy ou t of
wedlock, the putative fa ther retains
parental rights to the extent that he is
ready to assume his share of responsibility for the child's future needs. In
both cases, and this is the crux of the
argument, of course , the rights of the
unborn child, perhaps the most important claimant of all , must be respected
and protected .
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Human Rights
These catego ries of rights, I insist,
are not to be put in any "proper ty
rights" or simi lar economic frame of
reference. They represent elementary
human rights arising out of an
intimacy of union between responsible
persons which transcends purely utilitarian or proprietary considerations.
The governing consideration as far as
the unborn chi ld is concerned is
simp ly this : when do these rights come
in to existence? The answer offered
here, and I think it is the only answe r
compa tible wi th a pacifist commi tment, is that they exist at the moment
of conception marking the beginning
of the individual's life processes.

This has nothing to do with the old
theological arguments over whether or
not the soul can be said to be present
at conception ; it rests completely
upon the determination of whether or
not there is now someth ing " living" in
the sense that , given no induced or
spon taneous in terferences , it wi ll develop into a human person. We know
for certain that this fertilized ovum is
not going to develop in to a dog or cat
or anything else: whatever its present
or intervening states, it will at the end
emerge as a human child. One need
on ly consider the usual reaction to a
spontaneous or accidental te rmin ation
of a wanted pregnancy. The sorrow of
the prospective paren ts, a sorrow
shared by friends and relatives a like ,
testifies not only to the fact that
something has "died" but, also , that
this "someth ing" was human.

So, too , with the medical arguments over when the fetus becom es
"viable" and , therefore, eligible for
birth. It is the life that is present, not
the organism , which should concern us
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most. Once we agree that society's
origin and purpose lie in the fulfillment of human capacities and needs,
we have established the basis for a
reverence for life which goes far
beyond such purely technical determination . Should a life once begun be
terminated (whether before or after
the point of viability) because the
prospective mother did not have
adequate food and care or because she
was forced by the demands of her
social or economic condition to
undergo excessive physical or psychological strain , we would have no
problem about charging society with a
failure to meet its responsibility. There
is no reason to change this judgmen t
when the termination is brought about
by deliberate act, either to avoid some
personal inconvenience or to serve
what may be rationalized into the
"greater good" of the family unit or,
as the eugenicist might put it, society
as a whole. Just as rights begin with
the beginning of the life process, so
does society's obligation to protect
them.
Recently a new and somewhat
terrifying "viability" test has been
proposed in arguments supporting
abortion. No longer is it to be the
stage of physiological development
which determines whether or not life
is to be terminated but rather the
degree to which "personhood" has
emerged or developed. Although strict
logic might suggest that personhood
can be established only after the fetus
has entered upon its extra-uterine
existence (that is, after the child has
been born) advocates of this new test
are apparently willing to extend it
back into the later weeks of pre-natal
development as well.
Two objections to this test should
be immediately obvious . In the first
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place (and the "generous allowance"
of pre-natal personhood serves as a
good illustration of this point), we are
caught up with the same old problems
of judgmen t tha t plagued the older
viability standards: if the fetus is to be
considered viable at x-weeks, what
about the day before that period is
completed? If personhood can be
manifested in the pre-natal period
when, let us say, fetuses can be
compared in terms of differential
activity, what about the hour before
such differences can be noticed? Is
more activity a sign that personhood is
advanced, or migh t the absence of
much activity be a sign of equal ,
though differen t, emergence of personhood?
The second objection is even more
troubling. Under the old notion of
physiological viability, the child once
born was unquestionably viable. The
same may not be true - or may not
remain so in the face of changing
social definitions - once the emergence or development of personhood
is the measure. My experience as a
conscientious objector in World War II
doing alternate service in a home for
mental deficients introduced me to
literally hundreds of individuals whose
state of retardation was such that they
could be described as "animals" or
even "vegetables" by members of the
institu tional staff. Later, working in a
hospital for mental diseases, I attended
paretic and senile patients who had
reached the state of regression and
psychological deterioration at which
the same terms could be applied to
them and their behavior. However
ardent and sincere the disclaimers may
be, applying the test of personhood to
the unborn is certain to open the way
to pressures to apply that same test to
the already born. In this sense, then,
abortion and eu thanasia are ideological
twins .
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In the old theological formu lations
of the problem, the condemnation of
abortion was justified in terms of the
"sanctity " or the "intrin sic worth" of
human life . Today much of the
argument supporting abortion rests
upon similar abstractions applied now
to the intrinsic worth of the prospective mother's life or of siblings whose
living standards and life-chances might
be threatened by the add i tional
pregnancy . These are valid concerns
and deserve serious and sympathetic
understanding ; and society does have a
responsibility to find answers to these
problems that do not involve the
sacrifice of the human life that has
begun. Padfism and opposition to
abortion converge here, for both find
their ultimate justification in the
Christian obligation to revere human
life and its potential and to respect all
of the rights associated with it.

The developmental mod el use d by
those who propose emergen ce of
personhood as the test is basically
sound, but as used by the advocates of
abortion it becomes alogical enormity
arguing for a development from an
undefined or un stipulated beginning.
A more consistent approach wou ld see
human life as a continuity from the
point of clinically determin ed conception to the point of clinically
determin ed death. This physiological
life-span is then convertible to an
ex isten tial framework as a developmental pattern of dependen ce relationships: at the earliest stages of a
pregnancy the dependence is total ; as
the fetus develops , it takes on some of
its own functions; at birth , its bodily
functions are physiologically independent , but existential dependency is
still the chi ld 's domin ant condition.
The rest of the pattern is obvious
enough. As the individu al mature s and
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achieves the ful ln ess of personhood ,
both functional and behavioral independence be co me dominant (though
never total ; culture and its demands
must be taken into account). Finally ,
advanced age and physical decline
returns him to a state of dependency
which may , at the end, approximate
that of his earliest childhood.
Society's responsibilities to the
individual stand in inverse relation ship
to the growth and decline of hi s
independence and autonomy. It would
follow, then , that the immorality of
abortion (and euthanasia as well) lies
precisely in the fact that they propose
to terminate the li fe process when the
dependency is most total , that it
would do so with the approval or
authorization of society , that it would
seek to just ify thi s· betrayal of
society's responsibility on purely pragmatic grounds. The various claims
made for the soc ial utility of abortion
(reduc ing the
threa t of overpopulation and now pollution ; sparing
the already disadvantaged family the
strain of providing for yet another
mouth ; etc .) or the even less impressive justification s in terms of personal
and all too often selfi sh benefits to the
pro spective parent(s) have to be put in
this context; and once they are, they
lose much of their force.
The earlier refere nce to the sorrow
caused by the loss through mi scarri age
of a wanted child does not obscure the
fact that most abortion proposals are
concerned with preventing the birth of
unwanted children. No one will deny
that bein g rega rded as an unwan ted
intruder in the famil y circle will be
psychologically if not always physically harmful , but there should be ot her
solution s to thi s problem than
" sparing" th e intrud er this unple asa ntness by denying him life in the first
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place. If a chi ld is "unwanted" before
conception, science has provided sufficient means for avoiding the beginning of the li fe process.

Since the sex ual en light enmen t
burst upon us a generation o r so ago,
we have replaced th e old Victor ian
notions about " th e my stery of sex"
with a kind of mechanistic assumption
that man is the helpless victim of his
chemistry and un conscious impulses,
an assumption which reduces sexual
intercourse to a direct , natural, and
alm ost compu lsive response to stimuli
and situati ons. The other side of this
particular co in is the not so hidden
danger that man him se lf will be
redefin ed in st rictly biological terms, a
large ly accidenta l even t brough t in to
being by the union of tw o adult
organisms acting in response to the
irre sistible urge. This is refle cted in
many of the statements made by
advocates of abortion in their references to the conceived chi ld a a
"fert il ized ovum ." The term is perfectly accura te in the str ictly physiologica l se nse; in th e Ch ri stia n perspective, however, it leaves some thing to
be desired.

The act of intercourse , like any
other human act, is and must remain
subject to human responsibility. This
means that those who enter upon it
shou ld consider the possible consequences of th e act and acknowledge
responsibility for those conseq uences
if an d when they come to pass. Ideally
this would mean that unwanted
chi ldren would not be conceived;
where the ideal is not achieved - or
where the participan ts change their
minds after the child is conce ived - it
will be society's obligations to assume
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the responsibility for the new life that
has been brought into being.
Unwanted pregnancies resulting
from a freely willed and voluntary act
of sexual intercourse are one thing;
those resulting from rape require
spec ial consideration. Even here , I
would hold , the reverence for life
which forms the basis of this pacifist
rejection of abortion would preclude
the intentional termination of the life
process begun und er such tragic
circumstances. The appa rent harshness
of this position may be mitigated
somewhat by reflecting that pregnancies attributable to true rape (or
i!lcest) represen t a small proportion of
the unwanted. Certainly they do not
constitute a large enough proportion
to justify the emphasis placed upon
them by proponents of abortion. This
provides small consolation to the
victim who has already undergone the
physically and psychologically trauma tic experience of the assa ult itself
and mu st sti ll suffer the consequences
of an act for which she bears no active
responsibility. Neverthe less, the life
that has begun is a human life and
must be accorded the same rights and
protection associated with the life
resulting from normal and legitimate
conceptions. Here again society must
do what it can to provide all possible
assistance to the victim including
compensation (if one can speak of
"co mpensat ion" in this co ntext!) for
the sacrifice she has been ca lled upon
to make. In most cases we must
ass ume the mother will not want to
keep the child after birth, at which
poin t society' s responsibility for its
future development will become complete. If a mother does decide to keep
her child, society will sti ll have the
ob ligation to make some contin uing
provision for adequate care and
support.
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The position I have ou tlined here
has been described as unrealistic and
even irresponsible in that it absolutizes
the right of every "ferti lized ovum" to
develop, as one critic put it , "in a
planet which can no longer support
that kind of reproduction and where it
threatens the possibility of realizing
the lives which exist." The adjec tives
unrealist ic and irresponsible do not
trouble me; they are fairly standard
descriptions of th e pacifist approach,
and this is a pacifist case against
abort io n. Wh at does trouble me is the
rest of the criticism . The ability or
inability of the planet to support
present and projected population
totals is still a contested issue , and
even if the prospects were as desperate
as the statement suggests, the quest ion
would still remain as to whether the
termination of unborn life is a
desirable or acceptab le solut ion. And
as for the "realization" of the li fe
which exists, it is essential to face the
prior question of who is to determine
what that involves and by what
standard s. How lon g, we must ask,
before the quotas now being set in
terms of "zero popul a tion grow t h"
and similar quantitative formulae are
refined by eugenic se lec tionists into
qualitative quotas in stead? This is not
an idl e fear. and one would think that
a movement dedicated to the elimina tion of long-standing inequa lities based
on the qualitative dist inction of sex
shou ld be particularly sensitive to the
possibility.
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Beyond th is there is that matter of
"absolutizing" the right to life . and to
this I am ready to plead guilty. At a
time when moral absolutes of any kind
are suspect and the fas hi ons in theolog ica l and ethica l discourse eem to
have moved from si tuationa lism to
relativism and now to somet hing approximating indifferentism, it strikes
me as not only proper but imperat ive
that we proclaim the value of every
human li fe as well as the obligation to
respect that li fe wherever it exists - if
not for what it is at any given moment
(a newly fertilized ovum ; a convicted
crim inal ; the habitual sinner) at least
for what it may yet , with God's gracc,
become.

It is not just a matter of consistency ; in a very real 'ense it is the
choice between integrity and hypocrisy. No one who publicly mourns the
senseles burning of a napalmed c hild
should be indifferent to the intentiona l killing of a living fetus in th e
womb. By the same token , the Ca th olic, be he bishop or layma n, who
somehow finds it possible to maint ain
an olympian si lence in the face of
government policies which con templ ate the destruction of human life on
a massive scale , has no right to issue
indignant protests when th e same basic
disregard for human life is given expression in government policies permit ting or encouraging abort ion.
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